Russia at UN (Russian)
Russia at UN (English)

Statement by the Deputy Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation to the UN Mr. V. Safronkov, at the UN Security Council Meeting on Chemical Demilitarisation of Syria

[8th November, 2017]—I thank the Italian delegation for organising today’s meeting in open session. This allows us to make clear to all Member States Russia’s position on the issue before us.

We are grateful to Ms. Nakamitsu and Mr. Mulet for their briefings.

Russia strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons, wherever it occurs and whoever is responsible. In order to maintain the international non-proliferation regime, we regard it as essential to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. However, systemic deficiencies have been found in the work of the existing international bodies in the context of the Syrian chemical dossier. The results of their investigative activity on the use of toxic substances are deeply disappointing. Their mandates have been implemented selectively, without the use of the whole range of methods and means based on the high standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires first and foremost the collection of samples, interviewing of witnesses and gathering of evidence directly at the site of the incident.

The specialists from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic did their work remotely. Their report (see S/2017/567) is mediocre, full of omissions, inconsistencies and contradictions. They did not comply with the basic principle of ensuring the secure preservation of physical evidence. Samples were received on the territory of a third country [Turkey—JD], with no certainty as to whether they were gathered in Khan Sheikhun, elsewhere in Syria or even beyond the borders of Syria. The key question as to how the sarin might have been used and delivered to the site of the incident has not been clarified.

We were assured that a visit to Khan Sheikhun would be unsafe, although foreign experts from various States had allegedly been there the day after the chemical attack. No problems were encountered even with the Jabhat al-Nusra [n.k.a H.T.S—JD] terrorists. By the way, we asked our Western colleagues to share the details of their investigations so that our specialists could have a useful discussion, but we were stonewalled. When we invited representatives of the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat to Security Council consultations on 4 October, it suddenly turned out that they had already managed to reach an agreement with the groups controlling the Khan Sheikhun district concerning the experts’ visit. We should remember, in that regard, that Riad Hijab, the Syrian oppositions General Coordinator of the High Negotiations Committee, had given security assurances in a letter that our British colleagues circulated to the Security Council. In spite of all this, for unknown reasons, the OPCW experts did not manage to visit the site of the incident.

Now began unconvincing allusions to the power of science, thanks to which, apparently, everything could be discovered without anybody needing to move a step. Just imagine a situation where a case is being tried in court and it is suddenly revealed that the investigators did not visit the scene of the crime. In judicial practice, this would be completely absurd. We were then assured that the Syrian side had presented the results of its national investigation, which confirmed the use of sarin. Every line of the investigation apparently converged on the same conclusion and so the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat [Ahmet Üzümcü] decided not to deploy a mission to Khan Sheikhun. Our Western colleagues, for the first time that we can remember, all began to make references to the Syrian investigation.

I would also point out that the Fact-Finding Mission’s job is not solely to determine the fact that toxic substances have been used. It is also supposed to study all the available information on the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria, as is set out clearly in black and white in Resolution 2209 (2015). Owing to their selective interpretation of this Resolution, the OPCW mission failed to obtain key material evidence. All its conclusions were based on circumstantial evidence, the overwhelming majority of which was provided by the opposition and non-governmental organisations that have been entirely compromised, such as the White Helmets, who are closely linked to the terrorists of Jabhat al-Nusra. To take information from such people at face value sets a bad tone, to say the least.

Security conditions cannot be used as an excuse to justify the Fact-Finding Mission’s refusal to visit Shayrat aerodrome. The Syrian authorities were quick to guarantee secure access to the facility and asked for the visit to be organised as soon as possible. Under its mandate, the OPCW mission has the right to access any areas that might be implicated in the alleged use of chemical weapons. Nevertheless, its leadership did not consider it necessary to check the version of the story according to which the sarin munitions were delivered by Syrian aircraft from Shayrat aerodrome. And yet it was on that shaky basis that an act of armed aggression was conducted against sovereign Syria on 7 April [US cruise missile attack—JD].

We have repeatedly said that the OPCW’s investigation could have been much more objective if the members of the Fact-Finding Mission had been selected from a wide range of member countries in order to fulfil its mission, whereas it is a fact that its key positions were assigned to representatives of countries involved in the Syrian conflict and hostile to Damascus. With that in mind, it is impossible to ignore the fact that, just before today’s Council meeting, the Fact-Finding Mission issued a report on the alleged chemical incident in Al-Ltamenah on 30 March, based, incidentally, on its by now familiar remote investigation procedures. That is a striking coïncidence, especially when one considers that almost nothing has been heard of this incident during the past six months. This immediately gives rise to a number of legitimate questions as to who provided the samples and when; where and by whom they were gathered; how their preservation was assured during this entire time; whether the authorities in Damascus were asked for information… and so on. In the circumstances, one can only assume that the story was intentionally timed to coïncide with today’s meeting.

Neither did the specialists of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) for investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria visit Khan Sheikhun. This decision was taken by the Mechanism’s Leadership Panel [Mulet, Mogl, Cheng-Hopkins], which considered it unnecessary. However, the request to the Department of Safety and Security was still submitted, just in case, in October, six months after the incident occurred. After much cogitation, the JIM’s visit to al-Shayrat aerodrome did eventually take place, but it is not clear that this added any value, since the team of experts had not been asked to sample for traces of sarin. They were equipped to do so, having all the necessary technical and human resources, but did not do so because they had not been given the go-ahead by the leadership. And yet finding out if sarin had been stored at the aerodrome was crucial to establishing who was to blame, and was therefore the direct responsibility of the JIM.

The result of this series of gross errors by the investigative mechanisms is that the JIMs report of 26 October and its conclusions (see S/2017/904, annex) cannot stand up to any serious criticism. It is no accident that the text, including the section analysing what happened in Khan Shaykun, is full of locutions such as possibly, “probably”, “suggests” and “most likely”. I would like to ask Mr. Mulet if he really thinks such terminology is acceptable in a report on such a serious matter. Would it not have been better to inform the Council that the JIM was frankly not in a position to conduct a comprehensive investigation? The relevant Russian entities did a thorough scientific and technical analysis of the report and held an open briefing on 2 November to discuss the results. We urge everyone to familiarise themselves with the briefing. Its main findings are as follows.

The evidence for blaming the Syrian Arab Republic is based on a version of events that states that an aerial bomb containing sarin was dropped from a military aircraft flying near Khan Sheikhun, on an analysis of the crater created by the bomb’s explosion and on a determination of the presence of “sarin or a sarin-like substance” at the scene. However, the Mechanism’s conclusions are untenable, since the report fails to provide convincing evidence of the means of delivery, the type of munition used or the method by which the sarin was dispersed.

Turning to the results of the technical analysis based on our thorough examination, we find that according to the JIMs tracking of the Syrian Air Force Su-2,2 as provided by the United States-led coalition, the route was in fact to the side of and parallel to Khan Sheikhun. No manoœuvres by the aircraft were observed. In those circumstances, based on the JIM version of events, the dropping of the bomb could not have occurred along the aircraft’s flight path since non-guided munitions can be aimed only when the aircraft is precisely on course for its target but sideways on, at almost a 90° angle.

I would like to ask Mr. Mulet why the Mechanism concluded that this was technically possible. If it was in fact carried out although nothing was observed on the radar, then, going on the radius of the turn and the approach to the target, the Su-22 would have inevitably had to fly over a residential area, with an increased thrust and significant noise. But according to the JIM report, not one of the witnesses saw a military aircraft directly over the town. Our Russian experts have shown, using calculations and graphs, that an air strike on Khan Sheikhun was not technically possible. Why did the JIM not consult Russia, given that the aircraft is manufactured in our country? Then all these fantasies about the Su-22’s flight path would have vanished on their own.

The problem is that from the very beginning, the JIM leadership has looked at the aerial bomb version of the Khan Sheikhun events as the basic account, if not the only one. Anything that did not fit into it has been discarded, and the Mechanism has ignored the version about how the incident might have been staged, saying that nobody saw anyone preparing a ground-level detonation of munitions. How can one take that kind of reasoning seriously within the framework of such a serious investigative process? Who on earth would put together such a thing [in front of anyone] in plain sight?

Based on information from social networks, the Fact-Finding Mission received munition fragments supposedly found in the crater. I would like to ask Mr. Mulet if the JIM has analysed the metal fragments to determine the type of steel and whether it could be used to manufacture warheads. It is well known that carbon steel is used everywhere to make these kinds of munitions. If that was the case, why is the data not in the report? And if not, how can it be unequivocally concluded that there was a chemical bomb? There is a crumpled piece of pipe in the crater visible in the photographs. What, in the JIMs opinion, is it made of and what has it to do with an aerial bomb?

Let us consider the crater. If a chemical bomb with binary sarin had been dropped, there would unquestionably have to have been found, in or near it, the mixer that synthesizes the two components that produce sarin, as well as pieces of the tail unit. Nothing of the kind was found. I would like to ask Mr. Mulet why the crater has no signs of the entry channel that the impact of an aerial bomb always produces. How can one conclude that there was an aerial bomb when the crater’s shape is rectangular rather than elliptical? Every textbook on explosions says that such a crater is characteristic of an explosion from a horizontal, ground-based position. That also corresponds to the distribution of the burn marks on the surface of the asphalt. The edges of the crater were not turned outwards and there were no traces of displaced soil, which shows that the munition was sitting on the asphalt at the moment it exploded. Incidentally, the crater was paved over soon after the incident, which looks very like destruction of evidence. [to be exact, according to the report the hole in the tarmac was filled with concrete—JD]

As part of its work, the JIM commissioned a special laboratory analysis, which detected an impurity that is left behind after the formation of Syrian binary sarin from the precursor methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF). We would like to ask Mr. Mulet what this component’s concentration was and at what stages, and whether there was any verification of the likelihood of this micro-impurity’s being present in DF in any other processes where DF is used as a basic component for producing sarin. We believe that the impurities found in the samples should not be considered as unique markers solely for Syrian binary technology for producing sarin. It is also possible that the DF and sarin were deliberately synthesized following the known Syrian recipe. The chemicals could have been produced anywhere, in order deliberately to compromise the Syrian authorities, and as far as we know, that version of events was never considered. Nor has the possibility that homemade sarin was used in Khan Sheikhun been explored, although there could be evidence of that in substance samples. Does Mr. Mulet really believe that no one besides the Syrians is capable of producing sarin based on a specific known formula established through analysis? If so, why does he believe it?

I would like to ask Mr. Mulet if the JIM conducted a chemical analysis of the samples taken from the crater with a view to detecting and identifying traces of the explosive that released the sarin. If not, why not? After all, that would be the most logical way to determine the type of munition and explosion and the method used to disperse the sarin.

What has been noticeable is the visual materials produced immediately after the chemical incident, in which people are seen milling around the crater without special protective equipment. There are representatives of the White Helmets using respirators and cotton [surgical latex—JD] gloves, which provide no protection from the effects of sarin, and they seem to be feeling fine. That is proof that there was no sarin in the crater, since if a chemical bomb had gone off it would have produced a lethal concentration of the poison around the crater. There is reason to believe that a munitions exploded on the ground, after which the White Helmets shot the well-known video and only after that was the sarin released into the crater. And yet the White Helmets announced the possible use of chemical weapons even before the Syrian aircraft took off from Shayrat airbase.

I would like to ask Mr. Mulet if the JIM verified the information that the White Helmets had. Why was almost no attention paid to that fact during the preparation of the Mechanism’s report? The report also passes over one very important circumstance. In April, in the Security Council, the United States Permanent Representative showed photographs of Syrian children who had supposedly died from sarin poisoning. The pupils of the children in the pictures are noticeably dilated, whereas if they had been suffering from the effects of sarin, their pupils would have shrunk to the size of a pinhead. We asked the Fact-Finding Mission and the JIM to explain that inconsistency, but they avoided the issue. The report also notes that in 57 of 247 cases, the victims arrived at hospitals before the incident [is reported] actually [to have] occurred. That is one in four of the supposed patients, which excludes the possibility of carelessness in filling out the documents in the ensuing commotion. The Mechanism, however, decided to ignore that glaring discrepancy, forcing the available evidence into the Procrustean bed of the single, untenable aerial-bomb version. I would like to ask Mr. Mulet if 57 people is not rather too many to write off as poor record-keeping.

We are not undermining the authority of the JIM, simply proceeding according to facts and logic based on our thorough scientific and technical analysis of the report. We firmly believe that the Mechanism, vested with such an onerous responsibility, cannot continue to work in this way. If comprehensive changes are not made, it will remain a tool used solely to settle accounts with the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. That is the impression that is being given, and that is unacceptable. In extending the mandate of the JIM, we want to enhance its effectiveness and bring it in line with the high standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That is what our draft resolution aims to do, and we hope that our colleagues in the Security Council will approach that draft from a constructive, non-politicized perspective.

Even as some continue to try to find these imaginary chemical weapons in Damascus, the region is seeing an increasing threat of chemical terrorism. Owing to the not very constructive position taken by certain countries, it has been difficult to develop an appropriate response, despite the draft resolution that we put forward, together with China. The JIM has done nothing about this, even though anti-terrorist efforts are one of its main tasks under the mandate given it by the Security Council last year. The issue of chemicals continues to be used to increase tensions around Syria; ultimately, chemical terrorism could lead to a real conflagration that would have repercussions even beyond the Middle East.

In conclusion, I want to say that when, together with our American colleagues, we created the Joint Investigative Mechanism, we had in mind the goal of closing a large gap in international tools used to address such issues as investigating cases of chemical terrorism, and we considered the Mechanism as a preventive mechanism aimed at deterrence. Unfortunately, we have not been able to achieve that. I think that what Mr. Mulet said today would strike even people with the wildest imaginations:

With respect to the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Mechanism did not identify specific actors within the Government and institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic. The nature and logistics of the operation would involve a range of actors from different areas.

In other words, it stated in its report that the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic had not been determined, within either the Government or its various institutions, and that the character and the logistics of the operation might have involved a whole range of players from various areas. What kind of evidence is this? And then it wrote that the entire State of the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible.

We need to draw lessons from history. In its current form, the Mechanism represents a serious step backwards, even compared to the efforts of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, because in that case Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei clearly based their work on verifiable facts. They would not have dared to base it on assumptions such as those that I have just quoted from Mr. Mulet’s own statement.

Once again, I want to say that the Russian draft resolution aims at correcting these errors and systemic problems.

Additional Assessment of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism Seventh Report

The Russian Federation strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons (CW) by anyone anywhere. It deems important to identify those responsible and bring them to justice. That is exactly why Russia supported Resolution 2235 establishing the JIM two years ago and moreover became its co-sponsor. Furthermore the JIM and the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) being in coördination with each other were expected to provide for absolutely fair and highly professional investigation in order positively and persuasively to identify those responsible for CW crimes. Unfortunately these expectations were not realised.

A highly disturbing message was given a little more than a year ago when the JIM presented a report putting all the blame for three incidents of CW use on the Syrian Government. One of these incidents involves a pure fiction scenario. During the night a high-flying military helicopter allegedly dropped a chlorine filled barrel exactly into the ventilation shaft of the residential building with barrel diameter matching the size of a shaft almost perfectly. The report itself considered such an eventuality “improbable”. When presenting this report to the Security Council the former head of the JIM called this scenario “fantastic”. Nonetheless Damascus was held responsible. And now, whenever an opportunity presents itself, many keep repeating that “fair and highly professional” JIM has unconditionally found the Syrian authorities guilty on three occasions, including the aforementioned one. We have repeatedly asked both our Western colleagues and the JIM leadership about the mathematical probability of such a scenario: one in a million or one in ten million? Each time our partners refused to answer this question, referring to their poor knowledge of mathematics. They seem not to worry at all about the fact that the JIM verdict contradicts the laws of physics and ballistics.

The systemic weaknesses in the work of the JIM were fully exposed during the Khan Sheikhun investigation. In April, immediately after this tragic [sic] incident, Russia submitted to the OPCW Executive Council for consideration a draft decision prompting an immediate dispatch of international experts to Khan Sheikhun and the “Shayrat” airbase, where sarin used in Khan Sheikhun was allegedly stored. However this draft decision was unanimously blocked by the Western group of countries under flimsy pretexts. As it became evident later, both the FFM and the JIM have “got the message” from Western countries and flatly refused to visit either the site or the airbase. The FFM referred to the lack of necessary security arrangements. However, later it turned out to be untrue. The Director of the UN Department for Safety and Security informed the Security Council on 4th October, 2017 that in reality safety guarantees were duly received from the local field commanders, but the OPCW Mission declined to use that opportunity and chose to conduct the investigation remotely. This is a blatant attempt to mislead the international community. The FFM has also refused to visit the airbase claiming it is beyond its mandate and belongs within the competence of the JIM.

Then something similar happened to the JIM. Following our insistent calls to verify the presence or absence of sarin at “Shayrat” airbase it has stated that it is beyond its mandate and belongs to the FFM competence. Thus, both bodies responsible for conducting the investigation pointed at each other and evaded their responsibilities. [After all] In the end the JIM did visit the airbase but flatly refused to take samples despite the presence of experienced OPCW chemists and the access to the necessary equipment. All of this strongly resembles outright sabotage.

Russia did not demand from these two bodies anything beyond their mandates or the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In particular, we insisted that every method and resource available under this Convention is to be used during the course of the investigation including sampling, witness interviews and on-site evidence collection. These seemed to be very basic requests especially when facing such an important and delicate task of identifying those responsible for the CW-related crime. However, in accordance with established bad practices all our appeals and calls remained unheeded, and the investigation was conducted remotely—mostly in the offices in New York and the Hague as well as on the territory of Syria’s neighboring state [Turkey].

All this affected the quality of the investigation, which turned out to be extremely low. Suffice it to say that the FFM broke the basic “chain of custody”principle, which in Russian has the meaning of a strict order of actions to ensure the integrity of evidence. This principle, which is enshrined in the CWC and in the OPCW documents, implies that representatives of the OPCW must collect samples themselves and ensure their integrity during transportation to a OPCW certified laboratory where analysis is to take place. In fact, however, the FFM received these samples from the Syrian opposition on the territory of a neighboring country. The same concerns the witnesses that were interviewed first by the FFM and then by the JIM: no proof has been provided that these individuals were indeed present at Khan Sheikhun on the morning of April 4 this year. Thus it is extremely difficult to rely on their testimony. The adoption of such an approach by the FFM and the JIM can in no way be described as professional. As a result, the so-called evidence base that they collected is totally unreliable. That is why nearly every page of the report contains such words as “probably”, “possibly”, “presumably” etc. Such language is quite inappropriate for a report that claims to be substantial and thorough. It would have been more honest to report to the UN Security Council that under the current conditions the JIM was incapable to conduct a comprehensive investigation.

There have been other “miracles” during the investigation. It turned out, for example, that for some reason the OPCW Mission believed that its task was limited to establishing whether or not chemical weapons had been used. The rest seemed to be beyond its concern. Such an interpretation of their mandate fundamentally contradicts the relevant decisions of the OPCW Executive Council which were fully endorsed by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 2209. In fact, according to these decisions the FFM mandate is “to examine all available information related to the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria”. The FFM has actually refused to do this. That is why it refused to visit “Shayrat” airbase, and that is why it has been incapable of collecting all relevant and reliable information at the scene of the event. All this happened because the FFM arrogated to itself the right to calibrate its mandate contrary to the decisions of the policy-making organs.

Another example: Under the CWC the Syrian side has the full right to request and receive part of the samples collected on its territory at the site of alleged use of chemical weapons. But the OPCW Technical Secretariat has yet to respond to the relevant request of Damascus—it only promises to do so, and not even to the full extent. This is a direct violation of the provisions of the Convention. Such examples are numerous.

Moving on to the analysis of the Seventh report of the JIM, we are forced to state that it ended up being superficial, unprofessional and amateurish. Let us provide a vivid example of this. One of the episodes investigated by the JIM is the incident in Umm-Hawsh where a sulfur mustard agent (HD) was used. This investigation was initiated by the Syrian and Russian parties which brought it to the attention of the OPCW. Russian military personnel visited the site of the incident and found an unexploded handcrafted munition with HD which was then handed over to the OPCW for study and analysis. Based on this analysis the JIM made a conclusion that HD indeed was used in the course of clashes between ISIL and other armed groups opposing it. The JIM decided to lay responsibility for this crime on ISIL on the sole grounds that the other groups had never been seen using HD before. Such reasoning is simply astonishing and reflects very badly on the JIM’s level of professionalism.

As to Khan Sheikhun, the evidence for the alleged responsibility of Damascus for the incident is provided in the form of three main sections. First—the information related to the scenario that a sarin-filled aerial bomb was dropped from a Syrian Air Force aircraft passing by Khan Sheikhun. Second—the analysis of photo and video materials from the site of the incident, mainly those related to the crater caused by [sic] the explosion. Third—the analysis of the chemical compound sarin, traces of which were left [sic] at the site of the crime. Russian experts from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Russian National Authority for CWC implementation, have reviewed each of these statements and reached the following conclusions.

1. The Syrian aircraft Su-22 can carry out bombing in conditions of visual observation of the target, that is, from a height of not more than 4,000 metres. In this case, aiming of an unguided aircraft ammunition is done by manœuvering the aircraft to point it strictly onto the target.

2. The actual lines of the SyAAF aircraft on April 4, 2017, from 6 hours 37 minutes to 6 hours 46 minutes local time, which were monitored by the airspace of the coalition forces. Paragraph 30 of the JIM report states that, after reviewing the submitted materials and examining the testimonies, the JIM concluded that the aircraft did not approach within 5 km of Khan Sheikhun.

3. In the case of a bombing run from a horizontal flight at the speed of 800-1,000 km/h at altitudes up to 4,000 metres the distance between the bomb drop point and the target range from 1,000 m to a maximum of 5,800 metres. At the speed of 800 km/h and an altitude of 3,500 metres the maximum drop distance from the target is 5,400 metres. However, after the drop, the aircraft continues its movement and even after a side manœuvre it would have passed over or near the target, since its turning circle would have been 3-9 km. But the aircraft was not observed closer than 5 km from the [village] town of Khan Sheikhun. Moreover, when an aircraft manoœuvres, taking lists and gaining altitude, it requires a thrust margin and, consequently, racing the engine up to afterburning. Those modes of engine’s operation entail loud sounds, making them impossible to go unnoticed. If the bombing run is performed from a dive angle of up to 60 degrees the aircraft still has to pass over the target when exiting the dive, which does not correspond to the flight tracks on 4 April 2017.

4. Nowhere in the report is there any mention of the finding the tail fin of a bomb, which might have suggested the hole in the road was caused by an aerial bomb. It is common knowledge that even after the detonation of high-explosive or massive fragmentation aerial bombs the fin can always be found at or near the impact location.

Thus, there is no evidence that a chemical aerial bomb was dropped in Khan Sheikhun by Syrian Air Force Su-22 jet that was at least 5 km distant from Khan Sheikhun on 4 April 2017 at 6:30-7:00 a.m. The aircraft did not have the technical capabilities to drop an aerial bomb on Khan Sheikhun. The graphics to prove this conclusion may be found in the Annex.

Hence, the guilty verdict that the JIM so easily pronounced on Damascus has turned out to be inconsistent. This blunder seems to have happened because the staff and leadership of the JIM favoured the aerial bomb dropping version from the very beginning. At the same time the JIM totally ignored the version that the incident in Khan Sheikhun could have been staged. The justification was simply ridiculous—allegedly the JIM had not found witnesses who could see the militants of local terrorist groups preparing and initiating the explosion on the surface. Can such arguments be taken seriously?! It is clear that no one would conduct such a provocation in the presence of witnesses. Such operation would be carried out covertly.

The analysis of photo and video materials conducted independently by the Russian experts showed that the JIM had wrongfully treated so lightly the scenario of another staged event in Khan Sheikhun that entailed such tragic consequences [sic].

In fact, the destructive impact of the blast from an ordnance set off in the ground or in the rock is characterized by the explosion factor n, which represents the relation of the radius r (half the width) of the crater to the line of least resistance h (fig.1).

A steel ordnance creates three sheaves of fragments when it explodes; the front head – 20% of debris, the body sides – about 70% of debris and the bottom part – about 10%. When the ordnance is set off in static conditions, the dispersion of the fragments has the appearance comparable to that shown in fig.2.

When an ordnance is exploded on the impact trajectory, the velocity obtained by the fragments from the explosive device is combined with the velocity of the ordnance during the explosion as a result of which the side sheaves of debris will adopt a certain inclination in the line of the ordnance trajectory (fig.3). The inclination of the side sheaves and, therefore, the angle of debris dispersion in that sheaf significantly depend on the speed of the ordnance at the time of explosion since the initial speed of debris is approximately constant and varies from 500 to 1000 m/sec.

An aerial bomb on impact has great kinetic energy equal to:

Example:. The kinetic energy on impact of an aerial bomb M4000 (350 kg) at velocity V_BC = 277 m/sec is equal to

E=(350*277²)/2*9,81 = 1 368 764,016 kgm

The energy acquired by the aerial bomb during its drop when impacting the obstacle is dispersed in the following manner: one part of its energy is spent to work on the impact and another to deform the aerial bomb.

The amount of work spent on hitting and destroying the obstacle and the body of the aerial bomb can be disregarded due to its low value and considered that all kinetic energy of the bomb is spent on deforming the obstacle and the body of the aerial bomb.

Correlation between efficiency spent on deformation of the obstacle and the efficiency spent on deformation of the air bomb’s hull mostly depend on the strength of the casing. If the casing is strong enough to sustain the load of the explosion without residual deformation, the energy spent on its deformation is close to zero and almost all the kinetic energy of the bomb would be spent on the deformation of the obstacle (target). Sufficient strength of the aerial bomb casing was achieved with the use of high-grade steels and increased of the wall thickness.

The trajectory of the air bomb travel inside the soil is distinctive and depends on many factors which can not be pre-calculated. Usually an air bomb moving inside the soil deviated from the direction of the tangent to the point of incidence. Even when the axis of the bomb’s movement was congruent to its direction inside the soil, the resistance of the soil affecting the bottom part of the bomb was a bit stronger than the resistance affecting the top of it. This resulted in a new constituent of the overall resistance force – ‘P’ at the right angle to the trajectory of the penetration of an air bomb (see fig.4). 

The point of application of this force was located ahead of the center of gravity, which resulted in upwards lift of the bomb’s axis.

The practice shows that deviation of the bomb’s trajectory curvature of the trajectory of a bomb in a solid homogeneous ground is less than in soft one. An unexploded aerial bomb at the initial phase of its movement inside the ground was heading straightforward with a minor angle to the vertical plane. At the final phase an aerial bomb would make a sharp turn and come to rest in a horizontal position or with its slightly elevated front section. In very rare cases, air bombs stopped in the ground in an upright position with the head down. When running into obstacles in the ground as well as in a stratified soil an aerial bomb had frequently changed the direction of its movement.

For practical purposes the bomb penetration depth into the ground h (fig.5) which equals vertical projected path L is of great significance.

The depth to which a bomb penetrates is affected by weight, its maximum diameter, shape and hardness of the case, as well as impact velocity, angle of impact and characteristics of the damaged surroundings. The greater the weight is and the less the diameter is, all other conditions being equal, the greater the penetration is.

The kinetic energy is proportional to squared velocity. It is natural that an air bomb with a high kinetic energy will do substantial damage and penetrate deeper into the obstacle.

The amplitude of the angle between an air bomb and an obstacle Θ_BC (figure 6) determines the projected path of the vertical penetration, i.e. the depth of penetration h. The greater the angle Θ_BC is, the greater the h value will be. At a vertical drop of an air bomb (Θ_BC = 90^º) the depth of penetration will reach the greatest value.

In practice, the depth of an air bomb penetration to the obstacle is most often determined by a formula, which was established based on the experiments on the Berezan Island in 1908 and called the Engineer or Berezan formula:

A₁ coefficient is equal to 1,3.

Chart.1 shows K_n coefficient variable by type of barriers.

An impact channel can serve as the evidence of an unexploded aerial bomb (UXB) in the soil. The impact channel diameter can show an approximate nominal weight of an UXB.

Chart 2 shows medium diameters of impact channels, possible nominal weight of the UXB and depth of its penetration.

In some cases an aerial bomb could be found at a greater or lesser depth, which significantly differs from that, indicated in the chart 2.

Impact channels in soil could be left not only by UXB. For instance, embedment in soil and detonation of an incendiary aerial bomb of nominal weight of 50 kg and more does not create crater due to insufficient explosive effect, but leaves in soil similar impact channels as unexploded aerial bombs.

From the above follows that:

- Form of crater caused by explosion of an ammunition in Khan Sheikhun has almost squared shape, what means that the ammunition at the moment of explosion was in the static position (spread of burn marks on the asphalt also confirms this).

- The edges of the crater are not turned outwards (there are no traces of displaced soil), which points to the munition located on the asphalt surface at the moment of its explosion.

- There are no characteristic traces of an aerial bomb’s penetration into the asphalt.

CONCLUSION: you can see in the photo the crater caused by some ammunition (an improvised explosive device) of a regular rectangular shape containing explosives with a TNT equivalence of 10-12 kg, that had been put on the asphalt surface, remained static, and then being exploded.

In this regard the JIM’s conclusion that an aerial bomb was used in Khan Sheikhun is untenable.

The JIM in its report operates also with results of chemical analysis, that were made by unnamed laboratories accredited by the OPCW. At the same time there is no specific information in the JIM’s report about expert conclusions and the results of chemical analysis.

While the presence of sarin or its precursors in the samples from Khan Sheikhun is unquestionable, a number of circumstances related to this fact is strange and need refutation.

The JIM alleges that “the sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Sheikhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic” (paragraph 93 (h)).

According to the Russian experts this conclusion is untenable. It is based on the results of analysis of the DF samples that were taken by the OPCW from the former stockpiles of Syria. According to an unnamed laboratory, commissioned by the JIM for this analysis (paragraph 83), the DF samples contained some impurities (PF6-) including isopropyl phosphates (paragraphs 85-88). According to information of the FFM (document S/1510/2017) the same impurities were found by one of the four commissioned laboratories in the two environmental samples taken from the crater. According to the Russian experts, this is not sufficient for attribution of these markers to the category of unique (paragraph 90) and characteristic exclusively of Syrian binary technology of sarin production.

Phosphorus hexafluoride (PF6-) cannot be a self-maintained compound but exists as an acid or its salt with metals or with tertiary amines. The report fails to explain in what form this was discovered, with what method it was identified and its percentage in samples. In paragraphs 85-87, it is mentioned that phosphorus hexafluoride (PF6-) can be produced using hydrogen fluoride and cannot be produced using another widely used fluorinating agent which is not mentioned in the report. It is well known that phosphorus hexafluoride is produced by fluorination of phosphorus chloroanhydrides also using fluorides of alkali metals and compounds of hydrogen fluoride with tertiary amines to obtain DF. The use of these technologies requires no high degree of competence or sophisticated production technology.

The presence of other markers (isopropyl phosphorofluoridates and isopropyl phosphates), in unspecified quantities, is linked in the report with the presence of phosphorus oxychloride in the samples of Syrian DF. Phosphorus oxychloride may be present as a by-product in the production of sarin obtained by other methods.

In view of the above facts, the attribution of phosphorus hexafluoride, isopropyl phosphorofluoridates and isopropyl phosphates to a category of unique markers characteristic exclusively of Syrian binary technology of producing sarin is baseless.

There is a statement in paragraph 84 that “the results of the analysis of the environmental samples collected in Khan Sheikhun confirm that sarin was produced by the binary route” with reference to the materials of the FFM. In such materials this information was absent.

Apart from that, a real possibility exists that the DF (methylphosphonic acid difluoroanhydride) and sarin were deliberately synthesized using the allegedly Syrian formulas which are well-known both to the OPCW and beyond that international structure to be utilised as a means of a provocation designed to compromise the Syrian government.

As for the JIM’s conclusion about the presence of sarin in the crater ten days after the incident that was linked to the use of the said toxic agent through the drop of the chemical aerial bomb, in the view of the Russian experts it is inconsistent. Such conclusions do not rule out the possibility of other scenarios, for instance release of given amount of sarin by means of explosion of a container with sarin on the ground. One is perplexed by the fact that despite the discussion on the kind of explosive that resulted in the release of sarin (para 61) during the investigation, no chemical analysis of the samples taken from the crater and handed over to the FFM with a view to determining the presence of residual explosive and its identification has been carried out.

Please also take note of the videos and pictures showing people without protective gear for breathing organs and skin made in the first hours after the examined incident. This fact points at the absence of sarin in the crater because at the explosion of chemical munition up to 30% of the toxic agent would contaminate the ground at the impact point and generate a deadly concentration around the crater, whereas miosis is caused by the concentration of only 0,0005 mg/l.

Taken into account the aforementioned, the JIM’s conclusion about the Syrian authorities’ involvement in the production and use of sarin in Khan Sheikhun is unsubstantiated.

Eventually, the report failed to present conclusive evidence either regarding the means of delivery, type of munition or the means of dispersion of sarin given the fact that the emphasis was made exactly on the corroboration of the use of binary sarin by a standard ordnance.

In such a case, the end product, sarin, forms directly in the body of an ordnance for which the latter needs to contain a special device to mix the components (a motor equipped mixer). No indications of its presence or witness accounts thereof were given (a standard mechanism of a Syrian chemical aerial bomb includes a mixing device, a motor with a mixer which would necessarily have to be present at the incident site).

The second related issue is the establishment of the origin of sarin that was dispersed in Khan Sheikhun. This is the focus of 10 paragraphs of the report (paras 81-91).

By doing so, the JIM report makes the first attempt to carry out the so-called attributive analysis.

After the Syrian side had handed over the information on the methods of synthesis of the “Syrian” sarin to the OPCW and the latter had retained the samples selected from the Syrian stockpiles before they were destroyed on the US specialised ship “Cape Ray”, a wide spectrum of opportunities emerged to carry out laboratory tests with an aim to determine all specific admixtures, the so-called markers of the chemicals, with regard to the stockpiles of Syria.

That’s exactly how the JIM proceeded by ordering a special laboratory research for purposes of the investigation of the sarin incident in Khan Sheikhun. This research, which had been conducted in a highly professional manner, discovered the admixture that remains after the synthesis of Syrian binary sarin from DF (methylphosphonic acid difluoroanhydride).

Unfortunately, the report does not provide information regarding the admixture presence at each stage. However, there are reasons to believe that this micro-admixture is phosphorus hexafluoride (PF₆-) which was detected by high sensitive equipment and became a certain marker and a link to connect the initial and final products (DF and binary sarin of the Syrian origin) – something that made it possible to correlate the chemical substance used in Khan Sheikhun and the DF stocks declared by Syria.

However, the investigation did not include the establishment of the probability of the presence of this micro-admixture in the DF under any other process where the DF is used as a basic component for the production of sarin. Perhaps, this micro-admixture was indeed present but had been never paid attention to. Another question is whether this marker maintains or is present in the process of obtaining sarin by traditional means or it is common only for the Syrian stocks of DF.

Unfortunately, these questions will most likely go unanswered because other countries that used to have DF stocks as a component to make binary sarin, had destroyed it already and did not keep samples that couldn’t be used to conduct such a research.

A probable makeshift production of sarin used in Khan Sheikhun was not considered at all in the report. It is not clear from the report either what samples were taken as a basis for the conclusions. Did the JIM receive the results of the samples analysis by the FFM and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey?

The Russian experts studied the results of the samples analysis made in particular by France and concluded that one cannot exclude the possibility that sarin used in Khan Sheikhun had been produced in an artisanal way. The French side analyzed 4 environmental samples and 2 biomedical samples (blood plasma). The analysis of environmental samples has established in three cases the presence of a chemical substance (sodium hexafluorophosphate) which can indicate an artisanal (non industrial) production of sarin.

To sum up, the conclusions and arguments of the JIM do not hold up against any criticism. It should also be added that the JIM, as the report testifies, has done literally nothing to implement the counter-terrorism tasks, outlined in its mandate when extended by UNSCR 2319 in November, 2016. It seems that the JIM just did not find time to engage in the fight against chemical terrorism: all efforts were spent to confirm the alleged scenario of a Syrian sarin aerial bomb.

Nevertheless, we would also like to note one positive point in the report. For the first time the JIM was brave enough to recognise that the photos and videos taken by the notorious “White Helmets” at the site of the incident and designed to provoke a wave of international outrage against Damascus, were cooked up in a most primitive way. The rescue workers from this organisation presumably known to be humanitarian but in fact closely connected to terrorists from the al-Nusra Front, just overacted by making evident the staged nature of their actions to seemingly assist the victims and decontaminate the incident site.

At the same time, the report completely ignores an extremely important circumstance. We would like to recall, that during one of the UN Security Council meetings last April the US Permanent Representative held up heartbreaking photos of Syrian children allegedly killed by sarin poisoning. According to US media reports, those photos played a key role in Washington’s decision to launch a missile strike on “Shayrat” air base. However, the photos clearly show the dilated pupils of children, while they should be contracted to a point size under sarin exposure. We urged both the FFM and the JIM to explain this contradiction, but no answer was given.

We would like to draw attention to another point in the report. It indicates that in 57 out of 247 cases the injured had arrived in medical institutions to seek assistance even before the incident actually occurred. And this fact is duly recorded. The JIM preferred to dismiss this blatant fact, explaining it by the chaos prevailing in Khan Sheikhun and its outskirts on the day when the chemical incident took place. Mistakes related to the registration of injured could occur in one, two or even a few cases, but not in each of the four cases. This has happened in 57 cases out of 247. It seems that the scale of these inconsistencies is indicative of the orchestrated character of these events, when a poor preparation of the provocation resulted in numerous failures. According to medical documents, some of the injured had oddly managed to seek help in a hospital located 125 km from Khan Sheikhun even before the incident. Comments seem to be superfluous.

One last point. As follows from the report, the above-mentioned “White Helmets” had signaled the possible use of chemical weapons even before the Syrian aircraft took off from the “Shayrat” air base. It is pertinent to ask where this surprising awareness comes from. It gives something to think about.

In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the Russian experts are trying to operate with concrete facts and arguments, while their opponents usually avoid any serious discussion and respond with slogans blaming Russia for allegedly undermining the authority and reputation of the JIM and the FFM. The answer is simple. Indeed, Russia is concerned about the reputation of these mechanisms and is keen to help them overcome the systemic failures and shortcomings in their work, which prevent us from according any respect for, or trust in, the results of their work. These mechanisms are involved in a highly important and serious endeavour, and ought therefore, to be capable of the tasks assigned to them. Their conclusions ought to be flawless; but this has so far not been the case.

ANNEX